Let me look at the full auth flow end-to-end before giving the assessment:
Ran terminal command: cat go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go && echo "===SESSION===" && find go-bff -name "session*.go" | head -5 | xargs cat
Ran terminal command: wc -l go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go && wc -l go-bff/internal/middleware/middleware.go
Ran terminal command: find go-bff -name "session*.go" -o -name "*session*.go" | grep -v test | head -10
Read [](file:///home/rey/Simplify/SimplifyConsulting_gateway/SimplifyHiring/go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go#1-1), lines 1 to 178
Read [](file:///home/rey/Simplify/SimplifyConsulting_gateway/SimplifyHiring/go-bff/internal/auth/session.go)
Ran terminal command: grep -n "CookieName\|SameSite\|HttpOnly\|Secure\|cookie\|Cookie\|SetCookie\|COOKIE" go-bff/internal/middleware/middleware.go go-bff/cmd/bff/main.go go-bff/internal/config/config.go 2>/dev/null | head -40
Ran terminal command: grep -n "SetCookie\|http.Cookie\|HttpOnly" go-bff/cmd/bff/main.go go-bff/internal/auth/*.go 2>/dev/null | head -20 && echo "---login handler---" && find go-bff -name "*.go" | xargs grep -l "SetCookie\|setcookie\|set.*cookie" 2>/dev/null | head -5
Ran terminal command: grep -n "SetCookie\|HttpOnly\|Secure\|SameSite\|cookieName\|CookieName\|MaxAge" go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go | head -30
Read [](file:///home/rey/Simplify/SimplifyConsulting_gateway/SimplifyHiring/go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go#30-30), lines 30 to 55
Ran terminal command: grep -n "COOKIE_SECURE\|COOKIE_DOMAIN\|COOKIE_SAMESITE\|SESSION_COOKIE\|SESSION_TTL\|SESSION_MAX" .env.backend | head -20
Ran terminal command: grep -rn "COOKIE_SECURE\|COOKIE_DOMAIN\|COOKIE_SAMESITE\|SESSION_COOKIE\|SESSION_TTL\|SESSION_MAX_AGE" .env* docker-compose.backend.yml 2>/dev/null | head -30
Ran terminal command: grep -n "audience\|Audience\|aud\|AUD" go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go go-bff/internal/config/config.go 2>/dev/null | head -20 && echo "---CSRF---" && grep -rn "csrf\|CSRF\|X-CSRF\|idempotency" go-bff/ --include="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go" | head -10
Ran terminal command: grep -n "audience\|expectedAud\|ValidAud" go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go && echo "--- token refresh ---" && grep -n "Refresh\|refresh_token\|access_token\|RefreshToken" go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go | head -20
Completed with input: grep -n "audience\|expectedAud\|ValidAud" go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go && echo "--- token refresh ---" && grep -n "Refresh\|refresh_token\|access_token\|RefreshToken" go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go | head -20
Ran terminal command: grep -n "Audience\|audience" go-bff/internal/auth/jwks.go && grep -n "refresh\|Refresh\|access_token" go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go | head -15
Ran terminal command: sed -n '60,120p' go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go
Ran terminal command: sed -n '120,230p' go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go
Ran terminal command: grep -rn "\.Verify\(\|Verifier\|NewVerifier" go-bff/ --include="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go" | head -20
Ran terminal command: grep -rn "Verify\|NewVerifier\|jwks\." go-bff/ --include="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go" | grep -v "jwks.go" | head -20
Ran terminal command: grep -n "verifier" go-bff/cmd/bff/main.go | head -20
Ran terminal command: sed -n '318,335p' go-bff/cmd/bff/main.go && echo "---" && grep -rn "Verifier " go-bff/internal/handlers/ --include="*.go" | head -10
Ran terminal command: grep -n "h.Verifier" go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go | head -20
Ran terminal command: grep -n "Verifier\." go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go | head -20
Ran terminal command: wc -l go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go && grep -c "Verifier" go-bff/internal/handlers/auth.go
Ran terminal command: grep -rn "\.Verify(" go-bff/ --include="*.go" | grep -v "_test.go" | grep -v "VerifyPassword\|VerifyRelation\|VerifyAssign\|VerifyJob\|VerifyOwn" | head -20
That confirms it. Now I have the complete picture. Here's the honest production-grade assessment:
---
## Auth Architecture: Full Honest Assessment
### What actually happens on every request
```
Browser → Kong → BFF (cookie) → Redis session → DB profile
```
This **works and is reasonable**. It's a classic server-side session pattern, not JWT-based at the edge. But there are **4 real problems** that need fixing for production.
---
### Problem 1 — CRITICAL: `COOKIE_SECURE=false` in production
In .env.bff and .env.auth:
```
COOKIE_SECURE=false
COOKIE_SAMESITE=lax
COOKIE_DOMAIN=
```
On `https://app.simplifyaipro.com`, `Secure=false` means the browser will send the session cookie over HTTP too. Any HTTP traffic (redirect, mixed content) leaks the session ID. This **must** be `true` in production:
```bash
# .env.bff (and .env.auth)
COOKIE_SECURE=true
COOKIE_SAMESITE=strict # or lax if you need cross-site links
COOKIE_DOMAIN=simplifyaipro.com # share across subdomains if needed
```
---
### Problem 2 — CRITICAL: Kong JWT plugin has 0 keys, will 403 everything on 4 routes
Routes `/backend-vendor-hiring`, `/notification-service`, `/import-export-migration`, `/hr-offer-letter` bypass the BFF entirely. They have the Kong `jwt` plugin enabled but **no keys are seeded**. Every request to these routes returns 401/403 right now.
**You have two choices:**
**Option A (Recommended)** — Remove Kong JWT from these routes and route them through BFF (session auth). Consistent, no key management.
**Option B** — Actually run the seed script so Kong has Zitadel's public keys:
```bash
ZITADEL_ISSUER=https://auth.simplifyaipro.com \
KONG_ADMIN=http://127.0.0.1:8001 \
bash scripts/kong-jwt-seed.sh
ZITADEL_ISSUER=https://auth.simplifyaipro.com \
KONG_ADMIN=http://127.0.0.1:8002 \
bash scripts/kong-jwt-seed.sh
```
But then the frontend must send `Authorization: Bearer <zitadel_access_token>` to those routes — not the BFF session cookie. Your login handler returns `access_token: sid` (the session ID, not a real JWT). The frontend would need to store the Zitadel token separately.
---
### Problem 3 — IMPORTANT: JWT `aud` (audience) claim is never validated
In jwks.go, the `Audience` field is parsed but the `Verify()` method never checks it against your expected audience. Worse — `Verify()` itself is **never called anywhere in the codebase** (declared in the struct, dead code). The only real validation at login is `h.Zitadel.VerifyPassword()` which calls Zitadel's API — that's fine, but your local JWKS verifier is wired up and unused.
You need:
```go
// In Verify(), after issuer check:
expectedAud := v.cfg.ZitadelAudience // e.g. your Zitadel project ID
if !slices.Contains(claims.Audience, expectedAud) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid audience")
}
```
---
### Problem 4 — MODERATE: No CSRF protection on state-changing routes
Cookie-based sessions require CSRF protection. The `X-CSRF-Token` header is in the allowed CORS headers list but there's no middleware that actually validates it. With `SameSite=lax`, CSRF is partially mitigated for top-level navigations, but POST requests from cross-origin forms can still bypass it. For `SameSite=strict` this is a non-issue.
---
### What IS good
| Item | Status |
|------|--------|
| `HttpOnly: true` on session cookie | ✓ correct |
| Sliding-window session TTL + absolute max-age | ✓ correct |
| Session stored server-side in Redis (not in token) | ✓ correct |
| Zitadel password verify before session creation | ✓ correct |
| Account blocked check before session creation | ✓ correct |
| AI gateway Lua auth delegates to `/bff/auth/me` | ✓ correct |
| JWKS logic itself (RS256, issuer check) | ✓ correct, just unused |
---
### What to do right now
**Minimum for production deploy:**
1. Set `COOKIE_SECURE=true` and `COOKIE_SAMESITE=strict` in both .env.bff and .env.auth
2. Pick one strategy for the 4 Kong-JWT routes: either run the seed script OR remove the `jwt` plugin from those routes and route through BFF
3. Set `COOKIE_DOMAIN=simplifyaipro.com`
**Soon after:**
4. Wire up audience validation in `Verifier.Verify()` or remove the dead `Verifier` field entirely since login uses `Zitadel.VerifyPassword` anyway
5. Add `SameSite=strict` to prevent CSRF (or add a CSRF token check)